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Abstract
By introducing external consumption habits and Limited Asset Market Participation in an
otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model we uncover a causality link between limited
asset market participation, consumption inequality and macroeconomic volatility. We also
obtain that monetary contractions have redistributive e¤ects in favour of asset holders, broadly
conrming the ndings in Coibion et al. (2012). Finally we analyze the impact of redistributive
scal policies that target consumption inequality between households groups. Such policies have
benecial implications for macroeconomic stability, bringing the dynamic performance of the
model close to the one generated by representative-agent DSGE models.
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1 Introduction
The years following the global 2007 nancial crisis have witnessed growing concern for incomes
inequality and for the distributional e¤ects of macroeconomic policies. Historically, redistributive
actions have been the domain of scal policies, but in recent years even monetary policies have come
under scrutiny for their e¤ects on inequality. For instance Coibion et al. (2012) document that in the
US monetary policy contractions have substantial and persistent redistributive e¤ects, increasing
income and consumption inequality. In this paper we investigate the link between inequality,
macroeconomic volatility and monetary policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model.
Theoretical and empirical dynamic DSGE models used for monetary policy analysis, such as
Smets and Wouters (2007), are ill-suited to address this issue, due to pervasiveness of the repre-
sentative agent hypothesis. Recent developments do introduce a distinction between entrepreneurs
and the rest of the households in the economy (Christiano et al. 2010; Brave, Campbell, Fisher,
and Justiniano, 2012; Del Negro Giannoni and Schorfheide, 2013), but the characterization of entre-
preneursfunction in the model is tailored to generate a nancial accelerator and cannot generate
redistributive e¤ects for monetary policy shocks.
Following Mankiw (2000), we base our analysis on the Limited Asset Market Participation hy-
pothesis (LAMP henceforth), drawing a distinction between agents who have full access to nancial
markets (Ricardian agents henceforth) and agents who do not participate in nancial markets (RT
consumers henceforth). Indirect support for the LAMP hypothesis is found in recent studies that
document households responses to temporary tax-reductions and public transfers increases (John-
son et al., 2006; Shapiro and Slemrod, 2009; Parker et al. 2011). Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) point
out that 40% of US households hold no wealth and no debt. Similar gures obtain on average in
the Euro area (Cowell, Karagiannaki and McKnight, 2012). Anderson, Inoue and Rossi (2013) use
US microdata to estimate individual-level impulse responses as well as multipliers for government
spending and tax policy shocks. They nd that wealthiest individuals tend to behave according
to the predictions of standard DSGE models, whereas the poorest individuals tend to behave like
RT consumers. Indeed the scal stimuli implemented in response to the 2007-08 nancial crisis
(Oh and Reis, 2011) were largely based on increased public transfers, apparently meant to support
consumption of liquidity-constrained households.
Bringing LAMP into an otherwise standard DSGE model allows to obtain a steady state char-
acterize by inequality in wealth holdings. This seems broadly consistent with empirical evidence on
wealth distribution in the US and in a number of developed economies, where half of all households
hold more than 90% of net wealth (Cowell, Karagiannaki, and McKnight, 2012).
The Lamp hypothesis has characterized a rapidly expanding literature which investigates the
dynamic stability of DSGE models where RT consumers cannot smooth consumption over the
business cycle. Galì et al. (2004) and Bilbiie (2008, Bilbiie henceforth) showed that satisfying the
Taylor principle may not ensure model determinacy in a very simple model where price stickiness
and LAMP are the only frictions. This result obtains because imperfect price adjustment to wage
increases causes prot losses which are entirely borne by Ricardian agents. As a consequence, a
real interest rate increase may be associated to a surge in aggregate demand and production even
if it induces a fall in the consumption of Ricardian agents. In contrast with Bilbiie, Ascari et al.
(2011) show that a modest amount of nominal wage rigidity is su¢ cient to limit prot volatility
and to restore the standard Taylor Principle even for a very large share of RT consumers. Other
contributions show that internal consumption habits (Motta and Tirelli, 2012) and steady state
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income and consumption inequality between the two consumer groups (Natvik, 2012)) restore the
Bilbiie result for empirically plausible calibrations of a business cycle model characterized by price
and nominal wage rigidities.
Our model di¤ers from previous contributions to the LAMP literature in three key aspects. First,
we assume external consumption habits, in the catching-up-with-the-Joneses tradition popularized
by Abel (1990) and widely used thereafter (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Christo¤el, Coenen and
Warne, 2008). This allows to model the reaction of wage setting decisions to RT householdsconcern
for relative consumption levels, a key driver for our results. Note that recent works do account for
external habits and LAMP, but the wage sensitivity to RT concern for relative consumption is
removed through some ad hoc assumptions (Coenen and Straub, 2005), Forni, Monteforte Sessa,
2009; Coenen, Straub and Trabandt, 2012; Furlanetto and Seneca, 2012). Second, we extend
the basic labor-only production function to include capital accumulation. This, in turn, allows
to investigate the e¤ects of wealth holdings inequality on dynamic stability and on the dynamic
adjustment to monetary policy shocks. Third, we analyze the impact of redistributive scal policies
that target consumption inequality between the two households groups.
In a nutshell, our key results are summarized as follows. External habits and consumption in-
equality have mutually reinforcing adverse e¤ects on determinacy. This implies that model features
which raise consumption inequality, i.e. net returns on physical capital and monopoly prots in
the goods market equilibrium, lower the threshold share of RT consumers which triggers indeter-
minacy. Fiscal transfer policies that reduce steady state consumption inequality have a strongly
benecial e¤ect on dynamic stability, drastically increasing the threshold share of RT consumers
that triggers indeterminacy. In contrast with previous results obtained in LAMP models based on
the internal habits hypothesis (Motta and Tirelli 2012), no benecial e¤ect can be obtained from
purely countercyclical scal transfers that cannot a¤ect long run income distribution. To the best
of our knowledge this is the rst contribution that identies a link between long-run inequality and
macroeconomic instability in a New-Keynesian DSGE model.
Turning to the analysis of monetary policy shocks we are able to document that unexpected
monetary contractions do have a persistent negative e¤ect on income distribution and consump-
tion inequality: monetary contractions are in fact associated to a fall in labor incomes. Activation
of steady state scal transfer policies substantially dampens the redistributive e¤ects of monetary
policies and brings the dynamic performance close to the predictions of DSGE models based on the
representative agent hypothesis. Both common wisdom and recent empirical work (Immervoll and
Richardson, 2011) suggest that governments implement a substantial amount of income redistribu-
tion through their tax/benets systems. We provide an additional theoretical argument supporting
such policies.
Our concern for the redistributive e¤ects of shocks and monetary policies in the context of DSGE
models is shared by Monacelli et al. (2011) who distinguish between bond holders and entrepreneurs
who also are stock holders. The latter are relatively impatient and obtain loans from bond holders
subject to a borrowing constraint determined by their capital holdings. We emphasize two key
di¤erences between our results and theirs. First, in their framework a contractionary interest rate
shock leaves stock holders worse o¤ relative to workers, who are also the bond holders. Second, in
spite of nancial frictions, a substantial amount of risk sharing occurs between the two groups, and
the e¤ect of shocks on the economy is dampened relative to our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe in detail the model
structure, then in section 3 we present the results concerning the model stability. Section 4 presents
the models dynamic response to a monetary shock. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
In this section we lay out the structure of the model without capital in the rms production
function. Ricardian households participate in nancial markets, base their choices on intertemporal
optimization and react to real interest rate changes. By contrast, RT consumers do not hold any
wealth. For expositional purposes we consider rst a model where production requires no capital,
so that income inequality is only due to rms monopoly prots.
2.1 Households preferences
Households are indexed by i, where i 2 [0; 1]. RT (rt ) and Ricardian (o) consumers are dened
over the intervals [0; ] and (; 1] respectively. The common preferences are characterized by the
following utility function:























represents individual consumption of a basket of di¤erentiated













denotes individual supply of a di¤erentiated
labour bundle.
2.2 Firms
Goods markets are monopolistically competitive, and good z is produced with the following tech-
nology:
yt (z) = ht (z) (2)















denes the wage index.
The real marginal costs is:
mct = wt (1  ) (4)
where wt = WtPt is the real wage rate and  is a scal subsidy which is nanced by levying a lump-sum
tax, TLS , on rms.
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2.2.1 Sticky Prices
Price stickiness is based on the Calvo mechanism. In each period a fraction (1  p) of rms
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where ydt is aggregate demand and t is the stochastic discount factor.
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Ricardian households maximize (1) subject to the following period budget constraint.
Bt+1 + Ptc
o











Where B denes nominally riskless bond, R is the nominal interest rate and d denes real
dividends.












denes consumption marginal utility.
2.4 Rule-of-Thumb Households






1These rms face symmetrical marginal costs.
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2.5 Labor market
For each labor input there is a union j which monopolistically sets the nominal wage, W jt , subject
to (3). Each household i supplies all labour types at the given wage rates2 and the total number of












Ricardian and non-Ricardian households work for the same amount of time because we assume
that the two groups are uniformly distributed across unions, and demand for each labour type is











Finally, we assume that the representative union objective function is a weighted average (1 ,
) of the utility functions of the two households types (see Colciago, 2011; Motta and Tirelli, 2012).















is the RT marginal utility of consumption and w = w(w 1) represents the wage markup.
2.6 Aggregation
Aggregation yields:















2The assumption is that wages always remain above the marginal rate of substitution of all households. Therefore,
households are willing to meet the labor demand of rms.
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2.8 The model in log-linear form
We take a log-linear approximation around the zero-ination deterministic steady state 3 . Right
















where  =  1 denes the price markup.
2.8.1 Supply side
y^t = h^t (20)
w^t = lh^t  
h
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^t+1; (24)
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t+1 + R^t   Et^t+1 (27)







2.8.3 Monetary policy rule
R^t = ^t: (29)
3Hatted variables denote the log-deviation of a variable from its zero-ination, deterministic steady-state value.
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3 Stability analysis
In this section we investigate the e¤ects that habits and consumption inequality have on determi-
nacy. To identify the role of habits we posit that the production subsidy  =  brings production
at the competitive level. Under the additional assumption that the subsidy is entirely nanced by
lump-sum taxes levied on rms, as in Ascari et al. ( 2011), this implies that in steady state rms









1  b y^t 1 (30)
Note that due to price stickiness, rms prots are the inverse of marginal cost deviations from
steady state.4




1  b y^t 1 (31)
Using (20), (28), (30), and (31) it is easy to see that in equilibrium each optimizing household must
consume5
c^ot = w^t + h^t +
d^t














When  = 0 (and  = 1), an increase in current output is associated with a real wage increase
and with a prots reduction that exactly o¤set each other. By contrast, when  > 0 the increase







in . For "large" values of , prot losses exceed the positive labor income
variation determined by the increase in output. In this case  < 0 and c^ot is inversely related to
y^t. This point was initially raised by Billbie (2008), who demonstrated that the negative value of
 is associated to indeterminacy. Here we show that  unambiguously falls in b. From (21) and




t , inducing a
stronger reaction of wages to output.

















, B = 11 b.










1  l(1 ) + b  (1+b)1 b 1 
i
< 0 causes
the inversion of the IS curve. It is quite apparent that the habits coe¢ cient has negative e¤ect on
(A+B) if (1 b)b(1+b) <

1  .
Proposition 1 Under a Taylor rule that controls contemporaneous ination the model is stable and






4Due to the e¢ cient steady state assumption, prots are dened here as a fraction of steady state output.
















(1 b)[(l+ 11 b )+ b1 b ](+1)
2(+1)
 (34)
Proof. See Appendix A
Further insights on determinacy require that we impose restrictions on parameters. The parame-
ter governing the degree of habit persistence, b, and the labor utility parameter, l are respectively
set at 0:65 and 3, well in the ranges of the estimates obtained by Smets and Wouters (2005). We set
 = (1:03)
 0:25 which implies a steady-state annualized real interest rate of about 3%. Values for
price stickiness are taken from Christiano et al. (2005), p = 0:6, who nd that prices are optimized
every 2:5 quarters. This, in turn, implies that  = 0:2696
Under our benchmark calibration we obtain that the inversion of (33) occurs at  >  ' 0:18,
whereas  ' 0:21.6 Larger consumption habits unambiguously lower the threshold value . In
fact we obtain @

@b < 0 for 0:2 < l < 100, 0  b < 1, 1 <  < 100. The inverse of the Frish
elasticity, l, typically lies in the range 0:2-5 In Figure 1 we show that the corresponding value for
 monotonically falls from 0:25 to 0:1
3.1 The role of consumption inequality





























6Just like Bilbiie we nd that in principle a strong antination response can ensure determinacy under a Taylor
rule for any value of , but this would require implausibly large values for  . For instance, in our case 
 = 0:54 if
we set  = 40 and 
 = 0:72 if we set  = 100.







0. Our calibration for b ensures that this condition holds.
8To preserve comparison with (32) we dene prots as a fraction of steady state output.
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where  =








     11

 b
.9 We also obtain









































Assuming a price markup  = 1:2, we obtain  < 0 if 0:042 <  < 0:46, yet our calculations show
that determinacy obtains only if  does not exceed the threshold value  ' 0:13. To understand




















. Note that (37) is also crucial to identify the sensitivity of w^t to
y^t.





























































In fact when (37) holds, the e¤ect of a wage change on the consumption marginal utility of RT
households is so powerful that a positive wage reaction to an increase in labor demand cannot
satisfy equation (21), and the sign of the wage reaction to the output gap is reversed. In this case
an increase in output is associated to a fall in the real wage, to an increase in the consumption of
optimizing households and to a fall in c^rtt , as documented in (36).





expands the indeterminacy region: =1:2;=0 < 

=1:2;= for 0:2  l  5 (Figure 1).10





  b > 0, i.e. the marginal utility of Rt
consumption is positive in steady state.
10Our calculations also show that =1:2;=0 < 










Previous contributions (Colciago, 2011; Ascari et al., 2011) suggest that under wage stickiness the
potential indeterminacy caused by RT households is de facto unlikely.11 Following Colciago (2011),
we model wage stickiness by assuming that in each period a fraction w of unions cannot reoptimize
and hold their wage constant, whereas the remaining (1  w) unions setfWt to maximise a weighted
average of the two household types utility functions, conditional to the probability that the wage
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Relative to (38), it is easy to see that nominal stickiness (w > 0) dampens wage sensitivity to
business cycle conditions and limits income redistribution between the two households groups when
shocks hit the economy. As a result, the determinacy threshold is  ' 0:79 if we set w = 0:64.12
3.2.2 Capital accumulation
We now extend our model to include those elements which are common in medium scale DSGE
models (e.g. Christiano et al, 2005; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2005) such as capital accumula-
tion,variable capacity utilization and investment adjustment costs. Capital accumulation increases
income and consumption inequality because under LAMP only Ricardian agents hold physical cap-
ital k: Equations (2), (4), and (15) respectively become:

















= ct + it (45)
11We set w = 0:64 as in Christiano et al. (2005)
12This value is taken from Christiano et al (2005), and implies an average contract duration of 2.8 quarters.
11
where rkt is the net real rental rate of capital, it denes real investment.
13 Physical capital accu-
mulation is driven by









kt = utkt (47)
and # and S respectively denote the physical rate of depreciation and investment adjustment costs.
The following rst order conditions describe demand functions for capital and investment and



























































where Pk0;t is the shadow relative price of one unit of capital with respect to one unit of consumption.
Capital holdings in the hands of Ricardian consumers unambiguously increase consumption











































Given the previous discussion about the complementarity between external habits and income
inequality, we expect that the determinacy threshold should fall relative to the value  ' 0:79 we
obtained in section 3.2.1. We set  = 0:36, # = 0:025;as in Christiano et al. (2005). This, in turn
13 In the following we assume that  = 0. See the appendix for a description of the full model
14Pk0;t is the shadow relative price of one unit of capital with respect to one unit of consumption.
15Note that S (1) = S0 (1) = 0 and S00 (1) > 0, implying the absence of adjustment costs up to a rst order
approximation of the deterministic steady state.The function a (), instead, is assumed to satisfy a (1) = 0 and





16 Under this calibration we obtain  ' 0:29. Thus consumption inequality
in steady state has a very strong e¤ect on the determinacy threshold. This happens because the
larger consumption inequality, the more sensitive the nominal wage to the output gap, and the less
e¤ective is nominal wage stickiness in preserving determinacy.
3.2.3 Sensitivity analysis
Our analysis suggests that in a medium scale model determinacy should depend on a limited number
of parameters. Among these, the capital income share  and the price markup  inuence steady
state consumption inequality17 , whereas the habit coe¢ cient b, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity l,
the parameters governing price and nominal wage stickiness, p and w, a¤ect income redistribution
outside steady state.
Imposing  = 1 is equivalent to assuming an e¢ cient steady state. In this case  grows
from 0:29 to 0:79. Setting  = [0:3; 0:4] ;  varies between 0:45 and 0:11:For values of b in the
range [0:60; 0:67],  varies between 0:55 and 0:12.18 The threshold value  lies in the interval
[0:15; 0:38] for values of l in the range [0:2; 5]. Wage stickiness is another key parameter: raising
the frequency of wage adjustment to 4 quarters (w = 0:8) the threshold value 
 reaches 0:42.
The opposite result obtains considering the same frequency of price stickiness (p = 0:8): in this
case determinacy arises for  = 0:23: Prices and wages indexations do not play a signicant role
in determining the threshold quantity of RT consumers () for model determinacy.
3.2.4 Fiscal redistribution
Governments do reduce the dispersion of individual income and consumption levels by means of
factor incomes taxation and redistributive transfers.19 To assess the potential e¤ects of such policies
in our framework we now introduce a constant scal transfer to RT consumers, nanced by a
lump-sum tax paid by Ricardian agents, as in Galì et al. (2007). By assumption, the transfer is
proportional to the steady state consumption gap between the two households types.
T = T
 
co   crt (52)
From our discussion reducing consumption inequality between the two groups is crucial to limit
wage sensitivity to the output gap, the key factor that causes indeterminacy in our model. In
Table 2 we show that for  = 0:3 the ratio c
o
crt falls from 1:65 to 1:19 as 
T is raised from 0 to 0:5.
Correspondingly, we observe important e¤ects on the determinacy threshold , which grows from
0:29 to 0:71.
4 The redistributive e¤ects of a monetary shock
In this section20 we investigate the e¤ects of an interest rate shock on aggregate volatility and on
income and consumption inequality. In Table 3 we report standard deviations for key macroeco-
16Note that term c
rt
c
is independent from the fraction of RT consumers.
17See equation. (51)
18 b = 0:68 is the maximum value we can set for the habit persistence in order to avoid a negative steady state
marginal utility of consumption for RT consumers.
19See for instance Heathcote et al. (2010) for a discussion of the US case.
20 In Appendix E we present the full model in log-linear form and provide details of shocks calibration.
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nomic variables under full asset market participation (column 1) and under LAMP ( = 0:25) for
a di¤erent strength of the scal redistributive policy. In columns 2 and 3 we posit that  = 0:25 21
whereas parameter T in (52) takes values 0 and 0:15 which implies a 20% reduction in the post
tax Gini index in steady state.22 Then in column 4 we also consider the possibility that the scal






where we set  = 0:5 in line with a number of studies on the role of automatic stabilizers (Van den
Noord, 2000; Westaway, 2003; Colciago et al. 2008; Motta and Tirelli, 2012).
It is easy to see that without scal policies LAMP causes a substantial increase in volatility,
whereas redistributive scal policies have a powerful dampening e¤ect on volatility. Indeed volatility
gures obtained in the model characterized by LAMP-cum- scal-redistribution are very close to
those obtained in the standard representative agent model. In addition, the bulk of the stabilization
is obtained implementing steady state redistributive policies, whereas the cyclical rule (53) plays a
lesser role.23
To support intuition, we plot IRFs to an interest rate shock. In Figure 2 we consider aggregate
variables. Under full asset market participation ination output, consumption, worked hours and
the real wage fall. Introducing LAMP without scal policies causes an inversion in the relationship
between the real interest rate and output, that now increases in response to the contraction. The
real wage fall redistributes income in favor of Ricardian agents whose consumption grows, driving
the surge in total consumption. The increase in hours raises the productivity of capital, inducing
Ricardian households to raise investment as well. It is interesting to note that under full asset
market participation Ricardian households would do just the opposite, decumulating capital to
smooth consumption. Fiscal policies bring IRFs for aggregate variables under LAMP much closer
to what we observe under full asset market participation. Nevertheless, the monetary policy shock
still has redistributive e¤ects between the two household groups. In fact, in spite of the scal policy
actions the interest rate shock raises gapes in relative income and consumption levels (y^ot   y^rtt ,
c^ot   c^rtt ).
5 Conclusion
We embodied limited asset market participation in a popular medium scale New Keynesian DSGE
model. We showed that external habits and consumption inequality have mutually reinforcing ad-
verse e¤ects on determinacy, uncovering a causality link between limited asset market participation,
consumption inequality and macroeconomic volatility. Our framework also allows to investigate the
redistributive e¤ects of monetary policies which are associated to inequality of wealth holdings when
risk sharing is precluded.
We have also shown that redistributive policies targeting consumption inequality have bene-
cial implications for macroeconomic stability, bringing the dynamic performance of the model close
to the one generated by representative agent DSGE models. This suggests an intriguing conjec-
ture: these latter models might apparently succeed in matching business cycle facts when in the
21This value appears consistent wth existing estimates for  (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Coenen and Straub,
2005; Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa, 2009).
22This is consistent with empirical evidence for the US (Heathcote et al., 2010).
23Note that  = 0:5 has a very modest positive e¤ect on the determinacy threshold .
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real economy the underlying scal policy regime compensates for the e¤ects of LAMP, but their
performance might not be robust to scal reforms that limit discretionary policies and/or reduce
the e¤ectiveness of automatic scal stabilizers. Further, tighter regulation of nancial markets in
the aftermath of the 2007 nancial crisis should be complemented with more interventionist scal
policies. We leave this for future research.
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6 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
b 0:65 degree of habit persistence
 (1:03)
 0:25 subjective discount factor
 0:36 share of capital
# 0:025 depreciation rate
 6 price-elasticity of demand for a di¤erentiated good
w 21 intratemporal elasticity of substitution between labor inputs
 2:48 parameter governing investment adjustment costs
w 0:64 degree of wage stickiness
p 0:6 degree of price stickiness
 l 1 preference parameter
l 3 Inverse of Frish elasticity
 0 production subsidy
m 0:15 autocorrelation of the monetary shock
a 0:95 autocorrelation of the technology shock
m 0:24 standard deviation of the monetary shock
a 0:45 standard deviation of the technology shock
Table 2: Fiscal transfer, redistribution and model stability
T = 0 T = 0:05 T = 0:1 T = 0:15 T = 0:2 T = 0:25 T = 0:5
 0:29 0:46 0:54 0:59 0:62 0:65 0:72
co
crt when  = 0:3 1:63 1:51 1:43 1:37 1:32 1:29 1:19
Values represent percentage standard deviations
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Table 3: Theoretical Moments
monetary shock (r = 0:24; r = 0:15)
x  = 0 no fiscal  = 0:25 no fiscal  = 0:25; T = 0:15  = 0:25; T = 0:15;  = 0:5
y^ 0.0398 0.1064 0.0375 0.0385
c^ 0.0139 0.0706 0.0259 0.0190
 0.0303 0.1493 0.0564 0.0449
h^ 0.0460 0.1531 0.0391 0.0423
w^ 0.0331 0.2172 0.0688 0.0530
i 0.1102 0.3659 0.0590 0.0719
co 0.0139 0.0825 0.0121 0.0106
crt  0.0909 0.0899 0.0560
mc 0.0376 0.1582 0.0684 0.0550
Values represent standard deviations

























Figure 1: Red area represent the indeterminacy region when the steady state is e¢ cient, i.e.  = :
The sum of red and black areas represents the indeterminacy region when the steady state is not
e¢ cient, i.e.  = 0:
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a restrictionary monetary policy shock
21



























R T c ons umption













R ic ardian inc ome










R T inc ome























Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a restrictionary monetary policy shock
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A Determinacy Analysis
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1:











































(1  b) (1  ) ;
k =
(1  p) (1  p)
p
:
The system is characterized by two jump variables (^t and y^t) and one state variable (y^t 1).
The Characteristic polynomial is
PT (X) = X
3 + a2X







































The stability properties of the system depend on the location of the roots inside the unit circle in







it is in general possible to turn PT (X) into a Hurwitz polynomial24 PH (x), whose stability prop-

















24Note that jXj ? 1 () x ? 0
25See Samuelson (1941) and more recently, Felippa and Park (2004)- section 4 page 18, Ascari et al. (2011) and
Rossi (2011).
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which can be rewritten as
PH (X) = x
3 +

(3a0   a1   a2 + 3)







(a2   a1   3a0 + 3)






(a0 + a1 + a2 + 1)





1 + a2 + a1 + a0
1  a2 + a1   a0 =  x1x2x3
d1 =
3 + a2   a1   3a0
1  a2 + a1   a0 = x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3
d2 =
3  a2   a1 + 3a0
1  a2 + a1   a0 =   (x1 + x2 + x3)
where xi, i = 1; 3 are the roots of PH (x).
The necessary condition for models stability is:
d0 =









( + 1) + (2 + 2) (A+B)
> 0 (54)
Under the Taylor principle    1 > 0, therefore




















1 b + l +

1 + b+
(1 b)((l+ 11 b )+ b1 b )(+1)
2(+1)

When (54) holds, by Descartes rule stability obtains if either d1 or d2 or both are negative.
Since d1 < 0 if
 <
(2 (1  ) (1  b) +  (1 + b+ l (1  b)) +  ((1 + l) (1  b)  2b))
(2 (1  ) (l   b+ 2) +  (1 + b+ l (1  b)) +  ((1 + l) (1  b)  2b))
which is always true when condition (54) is satised, condition (54) is the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for determinacy under the Taylor principle.
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B Derivation of (35)






























where the real wage is
w^t = lh^t  
h
















are the marginal utilities of consumption for the two types of
households. Substitutig ^
rt
t into the wage equation we obtain












Remembering that c^rtt = w^t + h^t we obtain









































(1  ) 1  co
c











































C Derivation of (38)
We can rewrite the wage setting condition
w^t = lh^t  
h




















































: Substituting for the denitions of RT and Ricardian consumptions and







































D Steady state of the full model
The presence of RT consumers inuences the steady state uniquely for what concerns households
individual consumption levels. From equations (8) and (48), and assuming zero ination in steady



























































the aggregate resource constraint reads as:








































RT individual consumption is

























Optimizing households consumption at steady state is given by the sum of labour income, rms







rk   #K (68)
where d = (1  mc)y = (1   1 )y and  =  1 denotes rms markup. Thus optimizing agents are
richer the higher the share of RT consumers. Aggregate consumption can be nally rewritten as
c = (1  ) co + crt = wh+  +  rk   #K +  (R  1)wh (69)
E The full model in log-linear form.
Here we present the log-linearized model simulated in section 4. Shocks are introduced as follows.
Condition (43) now becomes





where At is an exogenous stochastic TFP term uctuationg around a steady state value normalized
at one,




t  N(0; 2a):
The monetary policy shock enters (29) which becomes
R^t = ^t + t;




t  N(0; 2m):
Aggregate consumption is dened by:










Marginal costs are given by cmct = (1  ) (w^t) + r^kt   a^t (71)
The following equation combines rmsF.O.C. with respect to production factors







Production function is given by
y^t = k^t 1 + 
1
2






























































Et {^t+1 = 0 (79)
Et^t+1 +  (1  #)EtP^k0;t+1   P^k0;t = EtR^t+1   rkEtr^kt+1 (80)
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Capital accumulation
k^t = (1  #) k^t 1 + #{^t (81)
Phillips Curve
p
1  p ^t = (1  p) cmct + p^t+1 +  
2
p






w^t    w1 w w^t+1+
  1 w ^t+1 + w1 w ^t+
  w1 w w^t 1
375 = (1  w)'h^t   (1  w)  ^t (83)
where
 ^t =
(1  )
crt
c   b
^
o
t +

crt
c   b
^
rt
t (84)
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